PipelineGuard

Free, open source, runs in your browser

Find the leaks in your GitHub Actions workflows before someone else does.

Paste a workflow file. PipelineGuard checks it against 36 known attack patterns, points at the exact line, and explains the fix. Your YAML never leaves the page.

Workflow scanner

Tip: press Ctrl + Enter to scan.

Paste a workflow on the left, or pick a sample, then select Scan workflow. Findings show up here as markings on a map of your jobs.

What it checks

The rules cover the attacks that have actually hit open-source projects: fork pull requests running with secrets, branch names that become shell commands, and tags that were quietly moved to malicious code. Each rule has its own write-up with a broken and a fixed example.

Read the full rule reference

RuleWhat it catchesDefault severity
PG001Untrusted pull request code runs with a privileged tokenCritical
PG002Attacker-controlled text is pasted straight into a shell scriptHigh
PG003Action is referenced by a movable tag or branchMedium
PG004GITHUB_TOKEN permissions are not restrictedMedium
PG005Secret is interpolated directly into a run scriptMedium
PG006Credential is committed in the workflow fileCritical
PG007Remote script is piped straight into a shellMedium
PG008Deprecated set-env / add-path commands are re-enabledHigh
PG009Self-hosted runner accepts pull request jobsHigh
PG010actions/checkout leaves the token in .git/configLow
PG011Container image is not pinned to a digestLow
PG012Privileged workflow trusts artifacts from an untrusted runHigh
PG013Job has no timeoutInfo
PG014Reusable workflow receives every secretLow
PG015Anyone can trigger this job by commentingMedium
PG016Privileged trigger without explicit permissionsMedium
PG017Manual workflow input is pasted into a shell scriptMedium
PG018Step or job output is pasted into a shell scriptLow
PG019if: condition is always trueHigh
PG020Password or token is passed as plain text to an actionHigh
PG021GITHUB_TOKEN is written into a run scriptMedium
PG022TLS certificate checks are turned offMedium
PG023Shell tracing is on in a step that has secretsMedium
PG024Whole workspace is uploaded as an artifactMedium
PG025Cache is used in a privileged workflowMedium
PG026Uses the removed set-output / save-state commandsLow
PG027Action is archived and no longer maintainedLow
PG028Job targets a retired runner imageLow
PG029Action had a publicly reported compromiseMedium
PG030Action name looks like a typo of a popular actionHigh
PG031Container runs with --privileged or the Docker socketMedium
PG032Dependencies are installed without the lockfileLow
PG033OIDC id-token: write is granted to the whole workflowLow
PG034Deploy workflow can run twice at the same timeInfo
PG035workflow_run trigger has no branch filterLow
PG036Security or test step is allowed to fail silentlyLow

Run the same checks in CI

The scanner is plain JavaScript with no dependencies to install, so the exact engine behind this page also runs as a GitHub Action and a Node CLI. Fail the build on high-severity findings, and send SARIF to the Security tab so issues show up inline on pull requests.

From a terminal:

npx github:yousafkhamza/pipelineguard .github/workflows --fail-on high
.github/workflows/pipelineguard.yml
name: workflow security
on:
  pull_request:
    paths: [".github/workflows/**"]
  push:
    branches: [main]

permissions:
  contents: read
  security-events: write

jobs:
  pipelineguard:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 5
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - uses: yousafkhamza/pipelineguard@v1 # pin to a release SHA
        with:
          fail-on: high
          sarif: pipelineguard.sarif
      - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@33d7b85da1a04171e211befe2c739303b9a4c066 # v4.39.3
        if: always()
        with:
          sarif_file: pipelineguard.sarif

Questions

Is my workflow uploaded anywhere?

No. Parsing and every check run in your browser. The only network request is the optional AI fix, which goes straight from your browser to Anthropic or OpenAI with your own API key. The key is kept in memory for this tab and is never stored by this site.

What is a "pwn request"?

Workflows triggered by pull_request_target or workflow_run run with a write token and your secrets, even when the event came from a fork. If such a workflow checks out and builds the pull request's code, anyone can open a PR that runs their code with your privileges. Rule PG001 catches this.

Why pin actions to a commit SHA instead of @v4?

A tag is a pointer that the action's owner, or anyone who compromises their account, can move. In March 2025 the tags of a popular action were rewritten to dump CI secrets into public logs. A full 40-character SHA can't be moved. Keep the version in a comment and let Dependabot update it.

How is the score worked out?

The score starts at 100. Each finding takes points off by severity (critical 35, high 20, medium 8, low 3, info 1), with smaller deductions for repeats of the same severity. Any critical finding caps the grade at D.

Does a clean result mean the workflow is safe?

It means none of these known patterns were found. Static checks can't see what a third-party action does internally or how your repository settings are configured. Treat PipelineGuard as a first review, not a sign-off.

Draft fixes with AI

Your key goes straight from this browser to the provider. It stays in memory for this tab only and is gone when you close the tab.