Free, open source, runs in your browser
Find the leaks in your GitHub Actions workflows before someone else does.
Paste a workflow file. PipelineGuard checks it against 36 known attack patterns, points at the exact line, and explains the fix. Your YAML never leaves the page.
Workflow scanner
Paste a workflow on the left, or pick a sample, then select Scan workflow. Findings show up here as markings on a map of your jobs.
0/100
Grade A
Job map
Each job is a pipe and each joint is a step. Markings show where the risk is. Select one to jump to the finding.
Findings
What it checks
The rules cover the attacks that have actually hit open-source projects: fork pull requests running with secrets, branch names that become shell commands, and tags that were quietly moved to malicious code. Each rule has its own write-up with a broken and a fixed example.
| Rule | What it catches | Default severity |
|---|---|---|
| PG001 | Untrusted pull request code runs with a privileged token | Critical |
| PG002 | Attacker-controlled text is pasted straight into a shell script | High |
| PG003 | Action is referenced by a movable tag or branch | Medium |
| PG004 | GITHUB_TOKEN permissions are not restricted | Medium |
| PG005 | Secret is interpolated directly into a run script | Medium |
| PG006 | Credential is committed in the workflow file | Critical |
| PG007 | Remote script is piped straight into a shell | Medium |
| PG008 | Deprecated set-env / add-path commands are re-enabled | High |
| PG009 | Self-hosted runner accepts pull request jobs | High |
| PG010 | actions/checkout leaves the token in .git/config | Low |
| PG011 | Container image is not pinned to a digest | Low |
| PG012 | Privileged workflow trusts artifacts from an untrusted run | High |
| PG013 | Job has no timeout | Info |
| PG014 | Reusable workflow receives every secret | Low |
| PG015 | Anyone can trigger this job by commenting | Medium |
| PG016 | Privileged trigger without explicit permissions | Medium |
| PG017 | Manual workflow input is pasted into a shell script | Medium |
| PG018 | Step or job output is pasted into a shell script | Low |
| PG019 | if: condition is always true | High |
| PG020 | Password or token is passed as plain text to an action | High |
| PG021 | GITHUB_TOKEN is written into a run script | Medium |
| PG022 | TLS certificate checks are turned off | Medium |
| PG023 | Shell tracing is on in a step that has secrets | Medium |
| PG024 | Whole workspace is uploaded as an artifact | Medium |
| PG025 | Cache is used in a privileged workflow | Medium |
| PG026 | Uses the removed set-output / save-state commands | Low |
| PG027 | Action is archived and no longer maintained | Low |
| PG028 | Job targets a retired runner image | Low |
| PG029 | Action had a publicly reported compromise | Medium |
| PG030 | Action name looks like a typo of a popular action | High |
| PG031 | Container runs with --privileged or the Docker socket | Medium |
| PG032 | Dependencies are installed without the lockfile | Low |
| PG033 | OIDC id-token: write is granted to the whole workflow | Low |
| PG034 | Deploy workflow can run twice at the same time | Info |
| PG035 | workflow_run trigger has no branch filter | Low |
| PG036 | Security or test step is allowed to fail silently | Low |
Run the same checks in CI
The scanner is plain JavaScript with no dependencies to install, so the exact engine behind this page also runs as a GitHub Action and a Node CLI. Fail the build on high-severity findings, and send SARIF to the Security tab so issues show up inline on pull requests.
From a terminal:
npx github:yousafkhamza/pipelineguard .github/workflows --fail-on high
name: workflow security
on:
pull_request:
paths: [".github/workflows/**"]
push:
branches: [main]
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
jobs:
pipelineguard:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: yousafkhamza/pipelineguard@v1 # pin to a release SHA
with:
fail-on: high
sarif: pipelineguard.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@33d7b85da1a04171e211befe2c739303b9a4c066 # v4.39.3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: pipelineguard.sarif
Questions
Is my workflow uploaded anywhere?
No. Parsing and every check run in your browser. The only network request is the optional AI fix, which goes straight from your browser to Anthropic or OpenAI with your own API key. The key is kept in memory for this tab and is never stored by this site.
What is a "pwn request"?
Workflows triggered by pull_request_target or workflow_run run with a write token and your secrets, even when the event came from a fork. If such a workflow checks out and builds the pull request's code, anyone can open a PR that runs their code with your privileges. Rule PG001 catches this.
Why pin actions to a commit SHA instead of @v4?
A tag is a pointer that the action's owner, or anyone who compromises their account, can move. In March 2025 the tags of a popular action were rewritten to dump CI secrets into public logs. A full 40-character SHA can't be moved. Keep the version in a comment and let Dependabot update it.
How is the score worked out?
The score starts at 100. Each finding takes points off by severity (critical 35, high 20, medium 8, low 3, info 1), with smaller deductions for repeats of the same severity. Any critical finding caps the grade at D.
Does a clean result mean the workflow is safe?
It means none of these known patterns were found. Static checks can't see what a third-party action does internally or how your repository settings are configured. Treat PipelineGuard as a first review, not a sign-off.